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WATER RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND CHANGING
ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

BY
JONATHAN H. ADLER*

Conventional enviro1m1entalist thought is suspicious of private
markets and property rights. The prospect of global climate change,
and consequent ecologjcaJ disruption0 has fueled the call for additional
limitations on p1ivate markets a..nd property Jight._c:;. This Essay presents
an altemative view. Specificall~ tl1is Essay blieily explains why
environmental problems generally; and the prospect of chm1gmg
environmental conditions such as those brought about by climate
change in particular, do not cowJSel fwther restrictions on p1ivate
property 1igl1ts and markets. To the contrary; the prospect ofsignificant
enviro11111ental changes strengthens the case for greater reliance on
property 1ights and mmxet institutions to addiess envirOJmwntal
problems, such as the management of fresh water resow·ces.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Conventional environmentalist thought is deeply suspicious of private
markets and property rights. Mainstream environmentalist thinkers believe
the segmentation and commodification of land and natural resources place

* Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law
and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Senior Fellow, Property and
Environment Research Center (PERC). This Essay was prepared for presentation at the
Enviromnental Law Symposium on Twenty-First Century Water Law in honor of Professors
Jan1es L. Huffman and Janet C. Neuman, Lewis & Clark Law School, Oct. 7, 2011. Portions of the
research for this Essay were conducted while the author was a Lone Mountain Fellow at PERC
in Bozeman, Montana.
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ecological values in pe1il. 1 AB envirom11ental law pioneer Eric T. Freyfogle
counseled, individual parcels of land are, by definition, "a tiny piece of an
entirety that is, in nature's terms, interconnected and indivisible."" From this
perspective, property 1ights and markets must be curtailed ancl restrained if
ecological values are to be preserved. 3 Property rights may be useful, but
only if carefully limited; constitutional protection of property rights, on the
other hand, would present a mortal ecological threae Markets may need to
be tolerated for economic purposes, but only if subject to extensive
regulation. Indeed, the organizing p1inciple of much environmental
regulation is that· government intervention is necessary precisely because
market institutions are incapable of safeguarding ecological values to any
meaningful e:x.-tent. 5

1 See, e.g, Rory O'Brien, Lan~ Proper/;]; and tile Enviromnent: An Introduction, in THINKING
ABOUT THE ENv1RONi\IENT: RKW!NGS ON POUTICS, PROPERTY, AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD 57, 57
(Matthew Alan Calm & Rory O'Brien eds., 1996) ("Defining property as something that is
privately held inunediately in1pacts the environment."); Eric T. Freyfogle, Symposium Essay,
Goodbye to U1e Public-Piivate Dir1de, 36 ENVTL. L. 7, 8 (2006) ("A major cause of
[environmental! trouble is the institution of private property rights in land."}; Eric T.
Freyfogle, Lecture, JJie Tragedy of Fragmentation, 36 VAL U. L. REV. 307, 313-14 (2002)
(arguing that private landownership does not actually promote ecological stewardship); Lynda
1. Butler, TJJe Patlw/ogv of Property Nonns: Liring Widun Natw·e's Bounda1ies, 73 S. CAL. L.
RE'!. 927, 931 (2000) (noting "the pervasive and pathological influence of property nor!lls O!l
ec:osystem heaH.l!'·;.
2 Eric T. FreyfogJe, Ormership and Ecology. 4:3 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269, 12G9 (1993); see
also Josepl1 L. Sax, 1:1kings, Plivate Prope1ty and Pubjjc Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 (l97l)
(noting ''interconnectedness between various uses of seemingly unrelated pieces of property").
3 See, e.g:, THE USE OF 1.;\ND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 23 (William K.
Reilly ed., 1973) (noting that "tough restrictions will have to be placed on the use of privately
owned land" in order to protect critical environmental resources).
4 See, e.g, FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING !SSTJE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTlTL'TfilNAL
LIMITS OF' GmERNil'lEf•iTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND VfiTHOLTT
PAYING COMPEN~ATWN TO THE OWNERS iv (1973) (warning a conshtutional compensation
requirement cmtlcl be the "weak !ink" in environmental protection etiorts); see also THE USE or
LAND: A CITIZENS. f't:JlJCY GUIDE TO URBAN GROW!H, supra note;], at ::04-25; .John D. Echeverria,
The TE!kings Jss·ut', in LET THE PEOPLE .JUDGE: WISE USE A1'1D THE PR!V ATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
MoVEillENT 143, U8 (John D. Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eels., 1995) ("There can be
little doubt that an eKpanclecl reading of the taldngs clause would in fact increase the cost of
existing envirmmtental programs and reduce the level of environmental protection Americans
currently enjoy.").
5 In the dominant formulation, government intervention is necessary to correct for
''externalities" generated by economic activity. Yet if, as Barry Commoner counselee!,
"[Ejverything ... is connected to everything else," BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE:
NATLTRE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 23 (1972), then e:x:ternalities are everywhere and the
justification for government intervention is never-ending. It is for this reason that Nobel
Laureate Ronald Coase argued that "the mere existence of 'externalities' does not, of itself,
provide any reason for governmental intervention." R. H. CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, ,>_ND THE
1.>\.W 26 (1988).
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Professor James Huffman is among those who have challenged this
"orthodox" envixonmental view." Through his scholarship and other
activities over the past few decades/ Professor Huffman has argued that
property 1ights and market institutions m·e not only "c1itical to the efficient
8
allocation of scarce resomces," but are essential for environmental
0
protection as well. As Professor Huffman would have it, greater protection
for property lights and respect for mmkets can lay the foundation for more
effective environmental conservation and ensure that enviromnental goals
are achieved in a more equitable fashion~ If more conservation is what
people want, markets will provide conservation more efficiently than
government administration or regulation. As a consequence, much of
Professor Huffman's scholmship has sought to defend the ecological value
of markets and buttress the case for constitutional protection of p1ivate
property rights. 10 Professor Janet Neuman, although not endorsing Professor
Huffman's brand of "free market environmentalism," has also helped
demonstrate the conservation value of property rights in natural resources,
particularly in the case of water, tlrrough both her scholm·ship and her work
as President of the Oregon Water Trust.'' Reflecting on tl1eiT work provides
an opportw1ity to reconsider the role of property rights and markets in
environmental protection.
The perspective that private property 1ights and market institutions
provide an effective fOlmdation for environmental conservation remains a
6 See James L. Huffman, Protecting the Em'iroJmJent from 01tllodox EnviroJUnentalism, 15
HA.Rv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 351 (1992) ("My goal in this paper is to umavel (or is the accepted
tenn now deconstruct?) environmental orthodoxy." (footnote omitted)).
7 Among other things, Professor Huffman has served on the boards of the Foundation for
Research on Economics and the Environment and the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation,
and he is the former Chair of the Executive Conunittee of the Environment and Property Rights
Practice Group of the Federalist Society. Lev,is & Clark Law School, Jan1es Hufiinan: Dean
Eme1itus, http://law.lclark.eclu/faculty/james_huffman/ Oast visited Feb. 18, 2012).
s James L. Huffman, 1J1e Public Inte1-est in Prjvate Property Jaghts, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 377,
379 (1997).
9 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 6, at 353 ("Free mru·ket environmentalists contend that left
to choose, individuals will allocate significant resources to environmental protection. Indeed,
they contend that we will get more enviromnental protection from the market than from
conm1and-ru1d-control regulation."); James L. Huffman, Jl1arkets, Regulalion, and Environmental
Proteclion, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425, 434 (1994) ("Neither markets nor command and control
regulation will solve all of our environmental problems, but the environment will cleru·ly suffer if
we do not give markets a chance.") [hereinafter Huffman, .Markets, Regulalion, & En~iroJUnentaJ
ProtectJon]; Jrunes L. Huffman, Envi.mnmentaJ Perspeclives: .Moving Towc7J'd a Jl1arket-Oriented
foilddle Gr01md, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (2004) ("The most decentralized approach is
the market. It is not a panacea for environmental policy, but it warrants more attention than it
has received over the recent decades of modem environmental politics.").
10 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Lucas: A Small Step in the Rjght Direction, 23 El'iVTL. L. 901,
902, 905 (1993); James L. Huffman, Judge Plager's "Sea Change" in RegulatOIJ' TaJdngs LaH~ 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 597, 611, 613-14 (1995).
ll See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 1J1e First Ten Yea1;o of the
Oregon Water TI1!st, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 433 (2004); Lewis & Clark Law School, Law Faculty
Janet Neuman: Pmfessor of Law, Retired, http://law.lclark.edu/facultyfjanet_neumrull (last
visited Feb. 18, 2012).
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minmity view. 12 Despite the success of property-based conservation
strategies and the prevalence of market-driven ecological advances, most
environmental thinkers continue to view property and markets with ·
suspicion. Property rights legislation and judicial decisions insulating private
property rights from governmental regulation are derided as "antienvironmental, "13 and there is a never-ending stream of proposals for
additional layers of regulation to constrain markets for the benefit of
ecological resources. H
The conventional environmental view has drawn strength from the
emergence of larger and ever more challenging environmental problems,
many of which are the consequence of industrial development and other
human activities. Chief among these is global warming, a "super wicked"
15
environmental problem, if ever there was one. It is now widely accepted
that human activity has contributed to an increase in the concentration of .
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and this will produce some degree of
atmosphe1ic warming. 16 The prospect of global climate change, and
12 To some, the very notion of "free market environmentalism" is an "oxyntoron." See James
E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Conunons, Part Two, 15 l:i<\RV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 332 (1992)
("[F]ree market environmentalism is, if not a moronic idea, at least an m:yrnoron. "}.
13 See, e.g., Ira Michael Heyman, Address, Property Rights and the Endangered Species
Act· A Renascent Assault on Land Use Regulation, 25 PAC. L.J. 157, 158 (1994); Douglas T.
Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project· A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the
P1vgress So Fw; 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 587 (1997); Joseph L. Sax, Using Property
Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996); Glenn P.
Sugameli, Takings BjlJs Threaten Pdvate Property, People, and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 521,522-23 (1997).
14 The fact that govemment intervention in the marketplace is, as often as not, at least partly
to blame for tile environmental problems to which these regulatory proposals respond is often
ignored. See Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 677-81 (2001) (explaining that federal development, tax incentives,
and regulatory policies induce environmental damage and increase risks to human health and
safety); see generally GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds.,
2002) (detailing how government policies can encourage environmental degradation).
15 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restra.i!ling tile
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159-60 (2009) (describing climate
change as a "super wicked problem" because it exacerbates problems e;,1Jonentially and any
future teclmology would have to achieve exponentially greater reductions to malce up for
lost time).
16 See Willian1 Collins et al., The Physical Sdence Behind Climate Change, SCI. AM., Aug.
2007, at 64, 68 (noting that the 2007 Intergovemmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report
concluded it was "vei:V likely' that hmnan activity was responsible for most of late 20th century
wamting, whereas the 2001 IPCC report concluded that human responsibility was only "likely');
kl at 65 ("Over tile past 20 years, evidence that humans are affecting the clin1ate has
accumulated inexorably, and with it has come ever greater certainty across the scientific
conununity in tile reality of recent clinlate change and the potential for much greater change in
the future."); see a.Jso Gabriele C. Hergerl eta!., Understanding and Attributing Climate Change,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WOR!GNG GROUP I TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 663,
665 (Susan Solomon eta!. eds., 2007) ("Greenhouse gas forcing has vezy likely caused most of
the observed global warming over the last 50 years."); BD. ON ATMOSPHERIC Scrs. & CLIMATE,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CU!v!ATE CHANGE 3 (2010) ("Climate
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consequent ecological disruptions, has fueled the call for adclition:il
limitations on plivate property lights and constraints on markets, and not
merely to the extent that market activities have themselves contlibuted to
the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
This Essay suggests that the conventional view of property 1ights and
enviromnental protection is misguided. Specifically, this Essay b1iefly
explains why environmental problems generally, and the prospect of
changing environmental conditions such as those brought about by climate
change in particular, do not counsel further restlictions on private property
lights and markets. To the contrary, the prospect of significant
environmental changes strengthens the case for greater reliance on property
17
lights and market institutions.
Water is a particularly pressing environmental concern, in the United
States and around the world. The need for water institutions capable of
adapting to inevitable climatic changes requires greater reliance upon
markets, not less. 18 Change is constant, and those institutions best able to
accommodate and adapt to such changes are those most necessary to help
address the threats posed by climate change. Above all else, this Essay
posits that if we take environmental concerns seriously, and if we are
concen1ed about the consequences of global climate change, we have to be

change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for-and
in many cases is already affecting-a broad range of human and natural systems."). Despite
widespread agreement on the existence of climate change, there remains significant debate
over the likely magnitude and effect of such change; most so-called "skeptics" within the
scientific community focus their criticisms regarding the alleged scientific climate change
"consensus" on these latter issues. See, e.g., PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR.,
CLIMATE OF EXTREMES: GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE THEY DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 12, 14, 19-20
(2009) (noting that Earth has e:x-perienced warming cycles in its history and that some industrial
emissions can actually counteract the warming effect of greenhouse gases); see also RoY W.
SPENCER, CLIMATE CONFUSION: HOW GLOBAL WARMlNG HYSTERIA LEADS TO BAD SCIENCE,
PANDERING POLITICIANS, AND MiSGUIDED POLICIES THAT HURT TilE POOR 80-84 (2008) (asserting
that the Earth has natural temperature variability and that human activity is only one
explanation for the current wanning trends); John R. Christy, The Global Wanrzing Fiasco, in
GLOBAL WARMJNG AND OTHER EGO-MYTHS: HOW THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT USES FALSE
SCIENCE TO SCARE Us TO DEATH 27 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2002) (arguing that global temperature
changes will be within an adaptable range for human beings and that we are capable of finding
and using alternative energy sources); PATRICK J. MiCHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., THE
SATANIC GASES: CLEARING THE AIR ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING 210 (2000) (noting that no one !mows
the rate of carbon dioxide increase nor the potential availability of future envirorunental
technologies that would displace fossil fuels).
17 At the san1e tin1e, a principled commitment to property rights requires talcing climate
change seriously as a potentially significant envirorunental tlu·eat. See generally Jonathan H.
Adler, Taking Property Rjgf1ts Seiious~v: The Case of Cliiilate Change, 26 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y,
Sunm1er 2009, at 296, 296-316 (discussing a free market environmentalism approach to
enviromnental policy in recognition that "human-induced climate change is likely to contribute
to environmental changes that violate private property Iights").
18 In this regard, this Essay draws upon Jonathan H. Adler, Water llfarketing as an Adaptive
Response to t11e TJu·eat of Clilnate CJ1ange, 31 HAJVILINE L. REV. 729 (2008).
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more open to p1ivate rights and p1ivate markets than the conventional
environmental perspective has been to date. 19

II. PROPERTY RIGHTS, MARKETS, ..A...ND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
It is somewhat cmious that private property rights are held in such low
regard by many enviroruuental thinkers. The early American conservation
movement relied heavily on private conservation efforts tmdertaken on
0
private land.' Some early conservation successes were dependent upon the
security private rights could provide for threatened environmental
resources.' 1 Throughout American history, property rights and markets have
been a somce of sustainability, whereas government _interventions-often at
the behest of powerful economic interests-have subsidized or otherwise
encouraged m1sustainable practices.''
Well-defined and defended property rights encourage greater resources
stewardship and sustainable utilization. This was a point made by ecologist
Garrett Hardin in his seminal article on "The Tragedy of the Comrnons"albeit a point that has been too often overlooked. 23 The problem, Hardin
noted, was not property rights, but the difficulty in e:A."tending such rights to
the full range of threatened resources.'~ Property rights, where enforced,
discipline resource use and encourage sustainability. 25 A robust system of
property lights can also mitigate the consequences of political indifference
or broader cultural ignorance about the negative ecological effects of
productive activity.'" It does not take a rnajmity vote of the legislature or the
successfitl navigation of the administrative process to protect private land.

19 For more on this general approach to environmental protection, see generally Huffn1an,
supra note 8; TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAl", FREE lV1ARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed.
2001); Adler, supra note 14; ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY: A FREE lVIARKET ENVIRONMENTAL
READER (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2000); Fred L. Smith, Jr., Markets and the Environment: A
Ciitica/ Reappraisal, 13 CONTEMP. ECON. PoL'Y, January 1995, at 62; Huffman, iVlarkets.
Regulation, & Em?!vnmental Protection, supra note 9; Fred L. Smith, Jr., A Free-ilfc.rket
Enviroim7ental Program, 11 CATO J. 457 (1992); Huffman, supra note 6; Richard L. Stroup,
Controlling Earth's Resources: Markets or Sodalism?, 12 PoPUL..i\.TION & ENV'T 265 (1991).
~o See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying teJ>.'t.
21 See, e.g:, Ike C. Sugg, H"ilere the Buffalo Roam, and W?ly, EXOTIC WII.DUFE, Jan.-Feb.
1999, at 14 ("[P]rivate conservationists saved the American bison from extinction.").
22 See discussion and somces cited supra note 14; see also PoLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM:
GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAJN (Terry L. Anderson eel., :WOO) (documenting the
manipulation of environmental policies for the benefit of economic interests); Todd J. Zywicki,
Emd.ronmental Rl'temalities and Political Extemalities: The Political Economy of Em-ironmental
Regulation and Refonn, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999) (same); ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (MichaelS. Greve & Fred 1. Smith, Jr. eels., 1992) (same).
23 Ga!Tett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,1245,1247 (1968).
24 I d. at 12,15 ("The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property,
or something formally like it. But the air and waters surTotmding us carmot readily be fenced,
and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means .... ").
25 See
Fred Smith, Epilogve: Reappraising Hwnanity's Challenges, Hwwwit;y's
OppOJtwuties, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 379, 384 (Ronald Bailey eel., 1995).
::'.6 See id. at 385.
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At the same time, the failure to protect and safeguard property rights tends
to undennine resource stewardship and shorten tin1e hmizons. Where
property 1ights are insecure, relatively little conservation takes place.
These are not theoretical claims. As a general proposition, private rights
in nature have tended to do more good than harm. As one looks at ecological
resources around the world, one observes a general pattern. Those
resources that are more fully integrated into property institutions tend to be
managed more sustainably than their unow11ed or politically managed
cmmtel}Jarts. This is not an invariable tendency-there are exceptions to be
sure-but there is a discernible pattern supporting Hardin's thesis.
Fishe1ies provide a useful case study. Mmine fisheries are, in many
respects, the archetypal open-access commons. In the 1950s, fishery
economists noted the commons problem that plagued all too mm1y mmine
27
fisheries, and suggested property rights as a solution. Since then, extensive
empirical research has shown that property-based fishery mm1agement is
more successful thm1 traditional regulatory approaches at averting the
tragedy of the marine conunons. 28 .A..s a recent review in Science showed, the
implementation of property-based systems tends to halt, and often reverse,
trends towmd fishery collapse. 29 Traditional government regulation has been
ineffective and other forms of government intervention, including subsidies
for favored interests, have been disastrous.
The expe1ience of mmine fisheries is not an isolated exa111ple. Sinillm·
30
patterns can be seen with mineral resources, forests, 31 terrestrial species, 32

27 Anthony Scott, The FisheiJr.· The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. PoL. ECON. 116, 116
(1955); H. Sco1:t Gordon, The Economic Thewy of a Common-Property Resource: The F'ishezy,
62 J. PoL. ECON. 124, 124 (1954}.
28 See, e.g, Robert Repe1:to, A Natural Expe1iment in F'ishelies Management, 25 MARINE
PoL'Y 251, 252 (2001) (comparing an Atlantic scallop fishery in United States, which was
regulated using fishing limits, witl1 a rights-based Canadian scallop fishery); R. Quentin Grafton
et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study ofa Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. &
EcoN. 679, 709 (2000) (documenting efficiency gains from the "privatization" of the British
Columbia halibut fishery); MICHAEL DE ALESSI, F'ISIDNG FOR SOLUTIONS 11-12 (1998) (using the
framework of property rights to analyze fisheries around the world); Richard J. Agnello &
Lawrence P. Donnelley, P1ices and Property Rights in the Fisheries, 42 S. ECON. J. 253, 253
(1975) (conducting that treating fisheries as a "common property re~>ource" results in less
efficient management); Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and
Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J.L. & ECON. 521, 522 (1975) (concluding tl1at communal
property lights, as compared to private lights, reduce labor productivity in the United States
oyster industry).
29 See Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent FYshe1ies Collapse?, 321
SCIENCE 1678, 1680 (2008).
30 See, e.g, Jerry Taylor & Peter VanDoren, Soft Energy Versus Hard Facts: Powering the
Trrenty-first CentwJ~ in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 118,
120-25 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000); Stephen Moore, The Coming Age ofA.bUlldance, in THE TRUE
STATE OF THE PLANET 109, 137 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995).
31 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Poplar Front: The Rebirth ofAmelica's Forests, in ECOLOGY,
LIBERTY & PROPERTY: A FREE MARKET EN\~RONMENTAL READER, supra note 19, at 65, 65-77; see
also Roger Sedjo, Forests: Conflicting Signals, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET, supra note 30,
at 177, 177-210.
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and even water. As one revieYF of enviTonmental and economic
performance across cow1tries observed, "envi~·onmental quality and
economic growth rates are greater in regimes where property rights are well
clefi..ned than in regimes vvhere propet·ty tights are poorly defined.""'
Propetty-based systems and market institutions, for all their imperfections,
tend to encourage more sustainable and efficient resomce use and
protection than the available altematives. Wl1ere such institutions can be
implemented, they tend to represent an environmentally supetior-or, at the
very least, a less environmentally infetior-management approach. 3"
It is important to recognize that reference to ptivate property tights
does not necessarily entail individuated ownership by profit-seeking
inclividuals. Property rights may be held and controlled in many forms.
Lat1cls owned by the Natme Consetvancy or a local land trust are just as
much private propetty as those ovvned by Ted Turner, Charles Koch,
Intemational Paper, or ExxonMobil. Many regimes charactetizecl as
"conmwn property" ar·e realiy forms of collective ptivate OVi11ership, a lessformal v<:Jxiant of a cooperative or condominium. Private ownership comes
in many forms, but it is distinct from a lack of ownership a.ncl eithe1· de jme
or de facto ownership by the state.
Private property tights also empm.ver i..nclivicluals and groups to pursue
ends other that1 profit, as well as to protect idiosyncratic or tmpopular
values. The institution of p1ivate ownership empowered the Audubon
Society to protect birds against market hunting at the tmn of the last century
and empowered Rosalie Edge to protect raptors at Hawk Motmtain."'' The
institution of private property also helped rescue the Ameticat1 bison (Bjson
Nson) f!'om the brink of oblivion brought about by their y,·antoa

J~ See, e.g., IKE SUGG & lTRS lillCl-'TER, 8LEPf"lo\NTS .AND IVORY: LESSONS FROM THE TRADE BAN
16, 51-53 (l9!H) (discussing gains in elephant populations and habitat resulting from quasiproperty-based management and conm1ercia! utilization); Randy T. Sinunons & Urs P. Kreuter,
Herd J11entail(r~· Baw1ing Irw.r Safes Is No ffa.r· to Siwe the Elephant, f,Q POL'Y REV., F3ll 1989, at
cl6, -!6.
:J:J See, e..!!., Andrew P. ~Jorriss, Rc>a! Pc:oplc, llc:al Rt?S"OUi'L'es. and fl2af Choices: The Case
for Market f~?luation of ff~?teJ; 3.S TE:I:. TEt:'fl L. Rr:v. 97:3, 97-!-75, 1008-10 (20061.
:J-! Seth W. Norton, Propercr· Rights. rl1e Enriromnent. and Economic Well-Being, in WHo
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT'' :37, 5 l (Peter .J. Hill & Roger 8. Meiners eels., 1998); see also Don
Coursey c~ Christopher Hmtvvell, LiHirownenra/ and Public Health Outcomes: An Intenwtional
and Historical Comparison (Harris Sell. of Pub. Policy Studies, Univ. of Chic3go, Working Paper

No. 00.10, 2000) (examining wl13t factors impact tlte quality of life and envirorunental
conditions across the world, particul3dy focusing on the relationship between econmnic
freedom and environmental quality).

~5

1

As A11drew Morriss notes. "Markets are far from perfect, of course. But, critiques of
markets in general, Elncl critiques of water markets in p::uticular, olten conl1ate diss3tisfactions
with human nahtre or other features or society with problems in the market." Morriss, supra
note 33, al: 975.
3fj See FRA.NK GRA.IHM, .JR., THE AUDUBON ARK: A HISTORY OF THE ]\/.J,.TIONAL AliDUBOI~
SOCIETY 9-10, 4-! (1990); see also .Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the F'uture of' Conse1ration:
Ll1angmg Perceptions ot'Propcr(f· Rigl1ts & Emironmemal Protecrion, 1 N.Y.U . .J.L. & LIBERTY
987, 1020<~1 (2005) (detailing how significant 3 tool priv3te property was for species
conserv3tion histmica!lyl.
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slaughter37-often subsidized and encouraged by those in political powerjust as it now enables water conservru1cies to protect instream flows ru1d, in
some cases, help counteract the damage done by decades of subsidized
38
water use and wasteful water infrastructure. Property tights are valuable to
those who seek profit, but they are no less valuable to those who seek other
ends, such as ecological conservation.
Ptivate property tights are not vvithout their flaws. Protection of
property lights cru1, among other things, reinforce pre-existing economic ru1d
social inequities. 30 All human institutions are impetiect, however, so the
question is not whether one set of institutions or another works pe1iectly.
Rather, the question is whether property-based institutions, and the markets
they facilitate, are preferable to the available political alternatives,
ecologically and otherwise, and whether greater reliance upon such
institutions can complement pre-existing conservation strategies to ensure
greater resource stewardship ru1d protection than we would otherwise see.
lll. WATER RIGHTS AND WATER MARI<ETS

Markets are not peliect. Nevertheless, markets are the most effective
means yet discovered for ensming efficient resomce allocation. Markets
facilitate the aggregation of inclividual choices and preferences so as to
encourage the deployment of resources to their greatest and highest valued
uses. If people value environmental an1enities, markets serve as a
comparatively efficient mechanism to ensure such amenities are valued and
protected. As Professor Huffman has observed, despite the inevitability and
persistence of so-called mmket failures, "it is abundantly clear that no social
institution yet conceived will yield greater net social welfare from a scmce
resource than a well-functioning market.".w Professor Robert Glennon,
author of Unquenchable," e:>..1Jlains:
The ability to transfer ownership creates ill1 incentive to shepherd the
resource wisely, to use property more productively .... This is the core idea of
markets. O·wners of property assess its value to themselves and part with it if
they will realize a profit. Buyers seek to change the use of prope1ty and capture

37 See Sugg, supra note 21, at 14 ("Bison were saved initially by si..x individuals who either
saw business opportunities in the existence of bison or sin1ply wanted to save a vanishing
species." (quoting VALERIUS GEIST, BUFALO NATION: HISTORY AND LEGEND OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN BISON 102 (1996))).
38 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 36, at 1017-18.
39 See, e.g., Robert Glennon, WaterScard/:j~ Jlfmkeling, a11d P1ivatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873,
1890 (2005) (noti..ng the controversy and conilict that can result from water p1ivatization efforts).
40 James L. Huf:finan, Water MaJ1(eting ill Westem P1ior Approprjatjon States: A llfodel for
tile Eas~ 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 432 (2004).
41 ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT
IT (2009).
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the value added by the new use. In this process, both sellers and buyers make
profits, and society benefits from increased efficiency. '"

This is no less true for water than for other resources."" Insofar as water
rights are ctm·ently allocated to comparatively inefficient uses, water
rnarkets can help reallocate water to where there is greater need. As
Glennon notes, "Water markets would facilitate the movement of water from
low-value activities to higher-value ones, thus resulting in a more efficient
deployment of the resource."""
Property rights provide the fotmdation for markets. In a market, it is
property rights (however defined) that are bought, sold, rented, or otherwise
transferred, temporarily or in perpetuity."5 Thus, it is the recognition and
gradual expansion of rights in water that have facilitated the development of
markets in water." 6 Without rights in water, water markets could not exist.n
But rights in water are not sufficient. The rights must be well-defined,
defended, a..'l.d subject to transfer, and the relevant transaction costs must be
sufficiently low.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, private rights in water were
established, but they were also limited by doctrines that constrained the
allocation of water to those uses most valued by individual owners. Prior
appropriation may have been an effective means of encouraging
development and diversion, and even of identifying initial property
8
endowments, but it did not encourage efficient water allocation and use."
Doctrines in1posing narrow conceptions of what constitutes a "beneficial
use" and threatening the forfeiture of water rights as a "reward" for
increased efficiency or conservation have further undennined the
development of more complete markets in water, as did appurtenance
requirements and lin1itations on transfers.w As demands for more efficient
water use and instream flows increased in the second half of the twentieth
Id at 307-08.
TerTy L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, IntroducUon: Taldng tl1e Plunge, in WATER
lVIARKET£NG-THE NEXT GENERAT£0N: THE PO LIT£ CAL ECONOMY FORUM xi, xi (Terry L. Anderson &
Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) ("[T]he efficacy of markets for averting resource shortages is no better
demonstrated Umn. with water.").
44 Glennon, supra note 39, at 1884.
45 See Securi11g Property Rjgilts: The FoundaUon ofilfarkets, ECON. REFORM TODAY, no. l,
1996, at 2, 2, available athttp://cipe.org/publications/ert!e19/El9_02.pdf.
45 See Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons kom the Development of Western FVater Law for
Emerging Waten}farkets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861,938-40 (2001).
47 See James L. Huffman, InsUtutional Constraints on Transbounda.r;r Water Jlfarketing, in
WATER lVlARKET£Nc~THE NEXT GENERATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY FORUM, supra note '!3, at
:31, 32 ("An effective market in water requires well-defined property rights .... "); Gle[\[\on,
supra note 39, at 1888 ("I£ water markets are to flourish, there must be a system of quantified
water tights that are transferable . . . . Without a property tight that is quantified and
transferable, there will be no voluntary reallocation of water use.").
48 Chtistopher L. Len, Synthesis-A Brand New f.Vater Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 55, 64
(2004) ("Prior appropriation has led to waste and poor choices about who receives water for
what ptu-pose.").
'19 See Huffman, supra note 40, at 438.
42

43
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century, state laws began to change-albeit quite slowly-gradually
facilitating the voluntary transfer of water rights both among users and for
vaxying uses, to generally positive economic and environmental effect. 50
The rela..xation of artif:icialliillitations on how water rights were defined
and could be used had enviromnental benefits. Such changes encouraged
more efficient water use and allocation. The gradual recog11ition of instream
flows as a beneficial use empowered conservation orgmlizations to enter
into the water marketplace and purchase or lease water rights for the benefit
51
of threatened fish populations. The broadening of water rights facilitated
the replacement of lobbying m1cl political maneuvering with voluntary,
cooperative transactions to reallocate water. The recogrution of property
1ights in water gives farmers a potentially mm·ketable asset, m1d the demm1d
for instream 1ights from conservatiorusts, recreatimlists, and others creates
a financial incentive to "use" water in ways that benefit species and local
52
ecosystems. Rather than seek the imposition of additional regulatory
controls, whlch may trigger conflict m1d litigation, water conservm1cies can
negotiate with farmers and ranchers to pmchase, lease, or otherwise
3
transfer water rights. 5 Additional legal changes enabling water rights owners
to keep gains from increased efficiency in water use has further added to the
potential gains from trade."'
This development has been slow, however, largely clue to legal and
physical limitations on water lights. Nonetheless, the volume of water
5
trades, leases, and purchases has been increasing. 5 Tllis is not surprising, as
econonlic analyses have concluded that the potential efficiency and welfare
gains from the transfer of water rights are quite significm1t. 55 By some
estimates, the net welfare gains from mm·ket-driven water transfers could be
7
greater than the value of the water 1ights themselves. 5
Insofar as excessive amounts of water axe devoted to agriculture, the
best solution is to facilitate the voluntary transfer of such water to other
uses, whether urban water consumption, environmental conservation, or

50 Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achtemmn, Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's
Jnstream Flow EJr:periments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1130-31 (2006).
51 See TERRY 1. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PR1MING THE INviSIBLE PUMP

120 (1997) (discussing !1ow by leasing water rights on Buck Hollow Creek from a rancher, the
Oregon Water Trust has kept the water in the stream of a steelhead (Oncorhynchus myldss)
spawning t1ibutary).
52 See, e.g., TERRY 1. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPJTAL!STS: DOING GOOD WHILE
DOING WELL 94-95 (1997) (describing how funds from the Northwest Area Foundation provided
a rancher with the financial incentive to use water in a mmmer that would encourage a recovery
of the local steelhead population).
53 See id. at 94-98 (describing the efforts of "enviro-capitalists" to avoid litigation by
acquiring various property rights).
54 See, e.g:, Neun13.11, Squier & Achtennan, supra note 50, at 1150.
55 Jeclicliah Brewer et a!., Transferring Water in the Ame1ican West: 1987-2005, 40 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1021, 1042 & fig.2 (2007).
56 Marian L. Weber, llfarkets for TVater Rights Under Em·iwmnental Constraints, 42 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 53, 53 (2001).
57 See Mon·iss, supra note 33, at 982.
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something else. Such transfers enhance welfare by allocating resomces to
higher valued uses, as well as by providing additional incentives for
sustainable resomce management and ilmovation. The possibility of a
market transfer induces lights owners to consider whether it is better to
mail1tail1 existil1g uses or sell theil· 1ights to another. This, il1 tmn, creates
incentives to use the resource in question more efficiently and economically.
If a farmer can sell unused water rights to a municipality or
conservation group, that farmer has a greater incentive to improve the
efficiency of his operations-or perhaps even to accept payment and cease
farming altogether. A failure to make cost-effective changes forfeits
economic opportmnties. At the same tin1e, if a municipal water system can
generate smplus water 1ights by il1creasil1g conservation or enhancmg
efficiency, it can create a valuable asset. In all cases, the potential
transferability of the lights induces rights holders to recognize the value
their rights could provide to others and to take such values il1to account
when maldng use and management decisions. As a consequence, the price of
58
water rights will reflect the value of potential alternative uses. The more
robust water markets become, the more powerful these incentives will beand the more pressm·e there will be for more efficient water use.
However compellil1g the case for greater reliance upon water markets,
il11plementing water markets can be a challenge. The physical natme of
water, the natural landscape, and the costs of transporting and monitoring
flows, 5n all complicate the move to markets. The transaction costs associated
with creating and sustail1ing water markets can be significant, but so too aTe
the potential welfare gains from maldng water markets a greater reality.
Authorizing trades does not guarantee tl1at markets will emerge, but if trades
are allowed, there is an incentive for entreprenems to discover ways to make
welfare-enhancing trades possible. Transaction costs may be an obstacle to
trades, but they are also evidence of an entreprenemial opportmuty.
Expanding water markets and maldng them more robust will take substantial
effort, legal and otherwise, but it is an effort worth uncleitakillg.
IV.

CHANGING ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Whatever the economic benefits of private prope1ty rights and
markets-whether for water or anything else-some wony that they conflict
vvith environmental protection efforts. The gradual evolution of om
58 See Paul Holden & IVIateen Tho bani, Tradable W~<ter Riglzts: A Property Rights Approach
to Resolving fVc?ter Shortages and Promoling Investment 11 (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1627, 1996), available athttp://v\rww-wds.worldbank.org/externaVclefault!WDS

ContentServer!WDSPIIB/1996/07/01/000009265_396121-!131318/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
59 See Brewer et al., supra note 55, at 1025 (pointing out complications impeding the
development of a water market); see also Morriss, supra note :33, at 986-87 (discussing
problems related to monitming water use ru1d the ways in which the unique attributes of water
affect users differently); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water flfa1:kets and tl1e Problem of Slliftizzg
Paradigms, in WATER MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATfON: THE POLITfC.-\L ECONOMY FORUM,
supra note 43, at 1, 17 (discussing challenges related to transpmiing water).
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environmental understancling and changes in ecological conditions are
identified as among the reasons to restrain markets and curtail property
lights. 60 From this perspective, the recognition that "everything in the
environment is connected to everything else," and the reality of persistent
ecological changes, some of which are due to human interventions, are
reasons to be wmy of protecting property rights and allowing markets to
influence the allocation of environmental resources. 61 What markets value
today may not be so important tomorrow.
This perspective tends to misunderstand some of the plimary virtues of
markets and underestimate the potential for markets to adapt to changed
conditions, pmticularly in comparison to the politically chiven alternatives.
The p1imary virtue of markets is not the generation of static efficiency, but
the constant pressure to allocate resources to their highest valued uses, even
as the value of competing uses change over time. 62 Markets are an immensely
powerful mem1s of discovering and aggregating time and place specific
information, including subjective value preferences, and markets are
constantly adapting as such information, or the conditions upon wJ:.Jch it is
based, evolve. 63
Above all else, the failure of economic central plmming is caused by the
inability of centralized systems to collect a11d process a sufficient volume of
infonnation to sustain efficient decision malcing. This is among the key
insights of Nobel Laureate economist Friedrich Hayek, who explained:
"[T]he lmowledge of the circumstm1ces of which we must mal<e use never
exists in concentrated or integrated fonn, but solely as the dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate
individuals possess. "6 Markets succeed precisely because the price system is
an effective mech311ism for discove1ing and integrating the dispersed and
fragmentary knowledge a11d information that individuals possess. 55
The ability of markets to respond relatively rapidly and effectively to
changes in exogenous conditions mal<es markets particularly well suited to
adch·essing environmental changes. As the world changes around us, the
relative demm1d for resources will change, as will the relative ease at which
various resources may be obtained. Mm·ket prices can reflect these changes
while at tl1e smne time providing incentives for would-be entrepreneurs to
find more efficient ways of meeting demands, ecological or otherwise.
A market system, in which paiticipants pay for the resources tl1ey use,
enables individual water users to. weigh the tradeoff between the cost of
obtaining additional water, the cost of reducing or conserving water use, and
other relevant factors. If markets are sufficiently "thick," prices can change
j

60 See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 1293-94.
61 See, e.g, CoMMONER, supra note 5, at 23; supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
62 Richard C. Feiock & Ch1istopher Stream, Emironmental Protection Versus Economk
Development: A False Trade-Off?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 313, 314-15 (2001).
63 See ANDERSON &LEAL, supra note 19, at 14-21.
64 F. A Hayek, Tlle Use off(nowledge li1 Sodet.J~ 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519, 519 (1945).
65 SeeM. at 524-26.
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in response to new information-based on new demands and new
environmental realities that affect the relative demand for and supply of
relevant resources:-:-far more efficiently anc! quicldy than can a centralized
regulatmy regime.'''' It is for this reason that many environmental e:x.verts
and even United Nations authorities, have recognizee! the potential value of
using water markets to help address the ecological changes that Will be
wrought by climate change."' The threat of climate change and
"nonstationmity" in water supplies does not lmclennine this case for lights
m1cl markets in water, but strengthens it.
For the same reasons that markets may encomage rampant
development of open space clming early periods of economic growth,
markets also encourage greater conse1vation and the provision of
environmental amenities as environmental preferences blossom in wealthier
populations.'" In each case, markets pmverfully Lmcover, aggregate, and
process information about what resom·ces are valued and for vvhat pm-poses,
and the cost at which such resomces are available. Environmental values
and preferences change over time, and 'Nell-functioning markets help
discover and actualize .such preferences, often much more effectively than
comparable political or conm1ancl institutions.

V. WATER lVlARKETS AN[, CLl!\'L,\.TE CIHNGE

Outside of W::t.shington, D.C., and the television sLuciios of various cable
news outlets, there is relatively little debate over whether human activity, in
the form of increased emissions of greenhouse gases, is contributing to a
gradual warming of the atmosphere. Scientists dispute the magnitncle of such
cha11ges, ancl the extent to which one may attrilllrte observed conditions or
specific events to climate change, but there ic: t2.ir!y '".ride agreement on the
fundamentals.'" Human activities have contributed to an increase in
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and, all else equal, a rise in
greenhouse gas concentrations will cont1ibute to a gradual climatic
vvarming, which will in turn have various eff1"cts on water re.som·ce.s."'
GG

lVIorriss, supra note 3:J. at fW-L

G7

See. e.g:,

CLiill".TE: CHANI;E: '2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTXI'ION .-\NL> VLUI8R.-'J3fLITY: CONTF:!BUTfON

R~::r·< •r:'~' ,:,r·' TrrE: !i'.TE:f:G<JVt:RNME:NTAL P..\NE:L ,,,N

or WoRrQNG GRour II Tn THs fouRTH As.sEssMcrrT
CLrlVLI\TE CHANGE 491 (Mactin Parry el al. eels., '2007),

GS

See

RICrl"J'W L. ::iTrWLiP. ECO-NOwflC'S: WHAT E:l'i':FY(''iC SilOULn !':Nnw AllCJUT ECCJCIOWCS

AND THE ENVfRONME:NT 1:3-l..J (2003); Kenneth E. iYkC,lnndl, Income' and the' DC'nwn! fix

Enr1ronrnental QuaJj(r; '2 ENV'T & DEv. ECON. :3S:3, 38:5-.'36 (reporting empirical evidence on the
envirorunental 1\uznets cuJvc'i; Nori:on, supra note :J-l. ~It -15 (noting that, insofm· as
envirorunental quality is viewed as a "good," consumption of etwironmental quality will increase
as ;vealth increases); BRUCE: YANDLE ET ."cL., ENVIfWNMENT.-\L 1\liZNE:TS CL;RVES: _-\ RE\11':\\' Of'
FiNDiNGS, METHODS, .-\ND POLICY lMPLfCATfONS '29-:30 ('200-!), itrcti!able at hll1J://w'NW.perc.org/
pclf/rs02_la. pcu·.
69 See sources cilecl supi~lnote 16.
7
0 Richard B.l•Jley et al., Swwwu:r- for

Po!k~rmake1s, in r::w.t-\TC CIL\li<":E '2007: THE Pm·srC ..\.L

SCrE:NCE BASiS: CONTF:fEUTfON or WORKING GROUP [TO THC f'OURTI-f ASSCSSMENT REPOflT or THE
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Iii. ai

l.

]-:]; Zhigniew \'i

2012]

WATER RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND ECOLOGICAL CHANGE

107

Further, at this point, some degree of climate change is inevitable and
unavoidable.' 1 Whatever mitigation measmes me eventually adopted (if any
are), some amount of warming will occur and, as a consequence, some
degree of adaptation is necessary. This is particulmly so in the case of water.
Climate change will have a dramatic effect on water supplies the world
over. While there is substantial uncertainty regmding the details of the
impact of climate change on water resources, such uncertainty does not
72
extend to the likelihood of such changes. As the world warms, 1ising
temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns will impact water
resomces. "TI1e most dominant climatic ruivers for water availability me
precipitation, temperature, and evaporative demand," all of which will be
73
influenced by greenhouse warming. According to the 2001 report of the
United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
"Available evidence suggests that global warming may lead to substantial
changes in mean annual strean1flows, seasonal distributions of flows, and
the probabilities of extreme high- or low-flow conditions. "74
Histmical assessments of ,,,-ater supplies are no longer operable. P...s the
lPCC cautioned in 2007, "lt is no longer approp1iate to assume that past
hydrological conditions will continue into the futme (the traditional
assumption) and, due to climate change uncertainty, managers can no
longer have confidence in single projections of the future." 75 As a
consequence, "[w]ater managers must now assume that existing hydrologic
models are no longer reliable and in many cases lead to an underestimation
of available supplies. "76
As a general matter, one may be able to say global wmming will mean
less snowfall, faster snowmelt, and increased evaporation. At the same time,
warming is expected to alter generally prevailing precipitation patterns,
increasing rain in some meas and decreasing it in others. 77 Some regions may
Kundzewicz et al., Fi·eshwater Resources and Their Managemen~ in CUMATE CHANGE 2007:.
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION A.ND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH
AsSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CUMATE CHANGE 173, 176, 177 tbl.3.1
(Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007).
71 See Roger Pielke, Jr. et al., Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597 (2007)
(noting some degree of climate change is "unavoidable" due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions to date).
72 See Kundzewicz et al., supra note 70, at 181 ("Uncertainties in climate change impacts on
water resouxces are mainly due to the uncertainty in precipitation inputs and less due to the
uncertainties in greenhouse gas em.i.ssions, in climate sensitivities, or in hydrological models
themselves." (citations omitted)).
73 Jd. at 180.
74 K. Duncan et al., North AmeJica, in CLIIVIATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE THIRD AsSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 735,745 (James J. McCarthy et al. eels., 2001).
75 Kunclzewicz et al., supra note 70, at 199.
7G Dan Tarlock, How Well Can Water Lar-v Adapt to the Potential Stresses of Global Climate
Change.~ 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. l, 2 (2010).
77 Kunclzewicz et al., supra note 70, at 177 tbl.3.1; see also E. Elgaali et al., High Resolution
Modeling of tl1e Regional Impacts of Climate Change on Jnigation Water Demand, 84 CLIMATIC
Cii.>\NGE 441, 460 (2007) (predicting that clinmte change vvill significantly increase inigation
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e:l\.'})elience fewer, but more severe, precipitation events that occur earlier or
later than such events had occUlTed in the past, but others may not. 78 .Many
analyses focus on the potential for climate change to produce water
shortages or droughts, but floods and oversupply in some regions are also
9
possible.' Indeed, "the jury is still out" as to whether climate change and the
resulting tinting shifts in precipitation will produce floods or low flows in
8
any given place. ° Compmmcling the problem is the fact that direct changes
in water supplies brought about by climate change will be augmented by
changes in hmnan utilization. Decreases in snowmelt or rainfall in some
regions may increase the demand for other sources of water for irrigation
and other uses. 81
While we may lmow that climate change is occUlTing, scientists are as
yet tmable to tell us what this will mean for water in any given region, and it
is unclear whether they ever will be. The difficulties of making precise
temperatme projections in given places pale in comparison to the difficulties
entailed with making predictions about precipitation. 82 Similarly, it is much
easier to make projections about changes over the course of years than
across seasons and months.~< As one reviewer concluded, "In the world of
model projections and in the world of statistical analysis, we have the most
confidence in statements about the least important aspects of hydrology (the
central tendency), and the least confidence in the most in1portant aspects
(extreme events). "8"
Climate change, like envirom11ental change more broadly, requires the
adoption of complex adaptive systems. 85 Specifically, there is a need for
systems that cru1 respond relatively rapidly to mlioreseen and unpredictable
changes; systems that are capable of discovering, dispersing, and accour1ting
for time- and place-specific information about new and emerging demands,
needs, and availabilities; and systems that allow for the reallocation of
3

demands but demonstrating a high degree of uncertainty surrouncling future availability of
water for irrigation); Kathleen A Miller et a!., Water Allocation in a Changing Climate:
Institutions a11d Adaptation, 35 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 157 (1997) ("Hydrologic analyses of
plausible climate change scenarios indicate possible substantial reductions in strearnflows in
some areas, increased flood frequencies in other areas, and changes in the seasonal pattern
of flows .... ").
78 See Kundzewicz et al., supra note 70, at 186-87.
79 ld
SO Robert M. Hirsch, A PeEspective on Nonstationm"ity and Water Jl1anagement, 47 J. A.Ivr.
WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 436, 438 (2011); see also Robin Kunclis Craig, "Stationality Is Dead''Long Live Transfonnation: FYve P1inciples for (_:'limate Chmzge Adaptation Lan~ 34 HARv. ENVTL.
1. REV. 9, 15-16 (2010).
8! Kundzewicz et al., supra note 70, at 191-94.
m Hirsch, supra note 80, at 438.
83 ld
8.J ld
85 See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Enrdronmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clea11 Up the EmiJ·onment by Making a Mess of Environmental Lan~ 34 Hous. L. REV. 933, 94041, 980 (1997) (discussing the reformation of environmental law into a complex adaptive
system model).
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resources in response to new challenges and oppmtunities. In short, the sort
of system that is required is that provided by a well-functioning market. Topdown, centrally controlled regulatory and administrative systems are not
sufficiently adaptive a.ttd responsive. Even if such systems could be designed
in theory, effective in1plementation is tmlikely, particularly given the
procedural obligations the Constitution and administrative law impose on
government actors.
Existing centralized water management institutions are scarcely able to
86
keep up with current stresses and demands. AE Professor Robert Glennon
notes, "[O]m· current water use practices are unsustainable,"87 and that is so
even if we do not account for climate change. Existing water management
systems carmot handle the additional stresses that will be placed upon them
by climate change, 88 particularly in an era of severe fiscal constraints. Wlille
one might conceive of a system with sufficient redundancies and safeguards
to manage a wide range of water supply and demand scemuios, the nation
cannot afford the costs that creating such a system would entail. A new
generation of centrally planned water iitfrastructme is not an affordable, let
alone cost-effective, means of addressing the water management challenges
global warming presents. 89
The dynamic tlu·eat posed by climate change strengthens the case for
greater reliance on water markets. AE Professor Dan Tarlock notes, the
"most promising GCC [global climate change] adaptation strategy is to use
the market to reallocate water to more GCC-stressed uses." 90 Professor
Thompson concurs: "As competing demands for our limited water supplies
grow, and as the possibility of global war.ming threatens to increase our
water supplies' year-to-year variability, the need for robust water markets
91
will increase. " I have also argued elsewhere that water markets are an
appropiiate adaptive response to the threat of climate change. 92
The case for greater reliance on water markets may not be universally
accepted but has been acknowledged by the IPCC. According to the IPCC, a
promising way to manage "the tmcertainty associated with estin1ates of
future climate change is to adopt management measures that are robust to
tmcertainty." 03 In its 2001 report, the IPCC advised that "improving the
fimctioning of water markets could help to create the kind of :flexibility

86 A 2003 Govenunent Accountability Office report found tl1at a majority of states expected
to suffer water shortages within the next 10 years, even in the absence of drought conditions.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 0FF1CE, GA0-03·514, FRESHWATER SUPPLY: STATES' VIEWS OF How
FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD HELP THEM MEET THE CHALLENGES OF EXPECTED SHORTAGES 8 (2003),
available athttp://W1vw.gao.gov/assets/160/157452.pdf.
87 Glennon, supra note 39, at 1873.
88 Id. at 1873-74.
89 Ke1meth D. Frederick, Adapting to Climate Impacts on t11e Supp~v and Demand for Wate1;
37 CLIMATIC CHANGE 141, 142 (1997).
90 Tarlock, supra note 76, at 20.
91 Thompson, supra note 59, at 24.
92 See Adler, supra note 18, at 732.
93 Ktmdzewicz et al., supra note 70, at 200.
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in

future

water

If water supplies decline in particular locations or seasons, water markets
could soften the impacts by moving water from lower to higher valued uses. In
the western United States, where irrigation now accotmts for more than 80% of
consumptive water use, water market activity is likely to continue the cunent
trend of movement of water out of irrigated agriculture to accommodate other
water uses. 95

The IPCC later noted that "short-term transfers can provide flexibility and
increased security for highly valued water uses such as urban supply, and in
some circumstances may prove more beneficial than constmcting additional
storage reservoirs. "96
Well-functioning water markets could facilitate the reallocation of
water to changing conditions, such as changes in population and economic
07
development. In the same fashion, water markets could facilitate changes
in reallocation in response to changing ecological conditions. Relying upon
political institutions to properly reallocate water in response to emerging
economic and ecological needs is folly. As Glennon cautions, "Allocation
decisions made through the political process will invmiably result in the
98
water being allocated to the most powerful economic interests. "
V.l ater n1arkets are no panacea-there is no panacea. But the features
that make water markets an effective mechanism for allocating water
efficiently, accounting for competing uses and evolving preferences, mal<e
water markets well suited to address emerging dynamic "nonstationru_ity" of
water supplies. Insofar as the greatest challenge posed by climate change
will lie in identifying how and where water supplies and demands m·e
changing in response to climatic changes, 00 in addition to economic
development and other hlrman activities, water markets can play an
extremely valuable role.
Water markets today remain quite constrained, however. Imperfectly
defined and defended water rights, restraints on transfers, and political
limitations hamper the ability of water markets to address changing
ecological conditions. Existing obstacles to water markets include regulatory
baniers, "inconsistent legal paradigms, opposition by governmental agencies
that control much of the water m1d key trm1sportation facilities, and to a
growing extent, concerns about the impact of transfers on exporting

94 Duncan
95 Jd.

eta!., supra note 74, at 748.

Kundzewicz eta!., supra note 70, at 198.
Glennon, supra note 39, at 1887.
98 !d. at 1895.
99 Id at 1874.
9G
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communities." The p1imary baniers, in this respect, may be political more
than they are legal, 101 but they are baniers nonetheless.
In order to facilitate the expansion and further development of water
markets several steps can be tal<en. TI1ese steps include 1) defining and
recogillzing the security and transferability of property rights in water
resources, 2) eliminating government subsidies for water use and
distribution, 3) moving toward market-based prices for water, and 4)
identifying and reducing legal and regulatory barriers to water transfers,
particularly interbasin and interstate water transfers. 102 As Professor
Thompson observes, "By providing the legal infrastructme for water
markets and actively encorn·aging such markets, the government can help
reduce the harm from tmcertainty in water 1ights and delive1ies. "103 It can
also facilitate further innovation in water institutions that can reduce the
transaction costs associated with water transfers and encomage more
efficient utilization of water resources.
AB steps are tal<en to reduce the transaction costs associated vvith
water markets, steps should also be taken to make water 1ights more robust.
Vruious water conservancies have been quite successful at obtaining ru1d
protecting instrean1 flows for the benefit of fish populations. JOJ Yet the
instrerun flows required today may not be those necessruy tomonow. Those
rivers or fish populations in greatest need of additional flows one decade
may not be those in greatest need in the future. Indeed, due to changes in
both the quantity and timing of precipitation events, and consequent chru1ges
in inigation and other water use practices, river systems that experienced
e:l..'tremely low summer or autumn flows in the past may expe1ience higher
volumes at those times of yeru· in the future, whereas areas v.rith little need
for enhanced instrerun flows in the past could need them in the futme. 105
Such possibilities not only reinforce the need for market systems to facilitate
the reallocation of water, but also highlight the need to remove constraints
on the marketing of rights.
TI1e reality of nonstationruity in fresh water supplies means that it is a
mistake to let the ecological needs of the present dictate the allocation of
water supplies in the future. Instrean1 rights acquired in the past to enhru1ce
stream flows should be available for sale or transfer in the future. The ability
of a conservation org3.11ization to protect fish populations and other waterdependent ecological values is maximized insofar as its liquid assets are, in
fact, liquid, so that the orgru1ization can facilitate the reallocation of
100 Thompson, supra note 59, at 6.
101 See Tarlock, supra note 76, at 21.
102 See CLAY J. LA.NDRY, STATE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAUSM: HOW WATER MARKETS CAN END
CONFUCTS: A GillDE FOR POLICY lVIAKERS 2-13 (2001) (providing an overview of reforms that
would facilitate the developmert of water markets).
103 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty c?nd Markets jn Water Resources, 36 McGEORGE L.
REV. 117, 125 (2005).
104 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying te11:t.
105 Jeffi-ey T. Payne et al., Jlfjtfgating the Effects of Climate Change on tlle Water Resources
oft.he ColumNa mverBasin, 62 CL!l\1..'\.TIC CHANGE 233, 234-35 (2004).
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resources to support the greatest ecological needs. In a dynanlic world with
constant ecological change, perceptions of today's environmental needs
sho-uld not result in the imposition of constraints that inllibit appropriate
responses to needs that emerge in the futm·e.
Just as water rights need to be defined so as to facilitate transfers, there
are environmental reasons to protect such rights from expropriation.'"" The
tlu·eat of government expropriation can cliscmu·age property owners from
investing in environmental conservation. Even regulatory measures driven
by environmental concems can discourage environmentally desirable
behavior on private lands.";' The ability of govermnent entities to take
property from private owners, whether tlu·ough eminent domain or
regulatory conscription, can tmdemline ecological conservation and
frustrate market development. AB Professor Huffman cautions, "If the
federal government or state governments are free to take or invalidate
vested property or contractual rights in water, water markets will not
be SUCCeSSful. nlOS

Constitutionally required compensation can mitigate such effects, but it
alone is not sufficient. F\uther protecting property rights, inducting rights in
water, by limiting the use of enlinent domain for economic development is
also wise. wo If climate change creates or exacerbates water supply problems
for politically important constituencies, political institutions will seek to
reallocate water accordingly. Ensming that water rights are real property
rigl1ts protected by tl1e Takings Clause of the Fifth 1\n1endn1ent can li1Tlit this
threat, as can state law measures to linut the ability of the government to
take water tights or other property save for a true "public use."

VI.

CONCLUSION

For too long, markets and property rights have been seen as obstacles,
if not enenues, of environmental protection. Yet market institutions and
private rights in natural resources will be necessary to overcome the
profmmd ecological challenges faced by hmnanity today and those that will
emerge in the fcttme. Those challenges presented by global climate change
loom large today-as well they should-but they are by no means the last
ecological challenge hm11arlity will face. At the same tirne, more rmmclane

lOG See. e.g:, James L. Huffman, ProtecNng Species Througi1 tile ProtecUon ol rfiJter Rights,
in REBl'[LDfNG THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM U6, 155-56
(Jonathan H. Acller eeL, 2011) (arguing that ptivate conservation measures and positive
incentives to conserve-if coupled with the strengthening of vvater rights against
appropriation-would foster an efficient, market-based avenue for conservation that would not
require counterproductive environmental lobbying for increased government restrictions on
land and water use).
107 Jonathan H. Acller, _Monex or Notl1li1g· Tile Adve1:se Emironment:1/ C!onsequences o{
Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 30:3-04 (2008).
lOS Huffman, supra note 40, at 443.
109 llya Somin & Jonathan H. Acller, The Green Costs ol Kelo: Economic Development
Takings :md Emiwnmental Protection, 84 \NASH. U. L. REV. 623, 623 (2006).
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enviromnental challenges persist all around us. Greater reliru1ce on property
1ights and rnru·kets could help us overcome these challenges, too.
Several yeru·s ago, Professor Huffman com1Seled that it was time to
"give mru·kets a chance when dealing with a resom-ce as special as water." 110
Time and the increased m1derstanding of the ecological challenges posed by
global warming ru1d other environmental chru1ges have only made this plea
more urgent. It is time to give fuller property 1ights and more robust markets
a chru1ce-now more thru1 ever.

110 Huffman,

supra note 40, at 433.

